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Summary
After 21 post-war years Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) found itself in a “middle-
income trap”. It is not classified into low income countries because workers and 
citizens do not accept low wages and low standard of living, nor does it fit into high 
income countries because those workers do not produce sophisticated products that 
ensure competitiveness, export and the basis for high wages and the standard of liv-
ing. The development vision of BiH is to become a high income country. However, 
the state has neither suitable strategy nor policy. 
This paper represents a detailed research of multifaceted secondary sources (i.e. 
journal articles, government publications, internet sources, etc.), conducted in a 
cross-sectional time manner. By utilizing secondary sources of data we conducted 
our own calculations based on data from the World Bank, the Central Bank of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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We hold that key sectors which would provide return to pre-crisis GDP growth 
rate of 6-7 percent per year, should be: financial system, diaspora and digitalization 
of industry (with the introduction of suitable strategies and policies), each of which 
would contribute to GDP growth of two percent per year. The key agents of change 
should be the leaders of value chains (large-scale companies), cities-regions, gazelle 
companies (fast growing small and medium size companies) and micro digital com-
panies. 
Key words: Macroeconomics, economic growth, savings, upper middle income
Резиме
Двадесет и једну годину након рата Босна и Херцеговина (БиХ) се нашла 
у „замци средњих прихода”. Она не припада групи земаља са ниским при-
ходом јер радници и грађани не прихватају мале плате и низак стандард 
живота, нити спада у земље са високим приходом јер радници не производе 
софистициране производе који омогућавају конкурентност, извоз и осно-
ву за велике плате и висок стандард живота. Визија развоја БиХ јесте да 
постане земља са високим приходом. Међутим, држава нема одговарајућу 
стратегију, нити политику. 
Овај рад представља детаљно истраживање вишеструких секундар-
них извора (односно часописа, владиних публикација, извора са интернета, 
итд.), спроведено у пресјеку времена. Користећи секундарне изворе подата-
ка, извршили смо властиту калкулацију на основу података добијених од 
Свјетске банке, Централне банке Босне и Херцеговине и Агенције за стати-
стику Босне и Херцеговине. 
Сматрамо да би кључни сектори за повратак на предратну стопу рас-
та БДП-а од 6 до 7% годишње требали бити: финансијски систем, дијаспо-
ра и дигитализација индустрије (са увођењем одговарајућих стратегија и 
политика), од којих би сваки допринио расту БДП-а од 2% годишње. Кључ-
ни носиоци промјене би требали бити лидери ланца вриједности (велика 
предузећа), градови-региони, брзорастуће компаније (мала и средња предузе-
ћа) и микро дигиталне компаније.
Кључне ријечи: макроекономија, економски раст, штедња, изнад про-
сјечни приход.
Introduction
After recovering from the post-war renewal and transition shock, BiH entered 
the “middle- income trap”, due to numerous reasons: (i) non-existent vision, the 
strategy and development policy, (ii) a lack of rule of law (i.e. non-functioning of 
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legal rules, especially the execution of unfulfilled contractual obligations) due to 
which the economic transactions with built-in rents slowly and scarcely perform, 
(iii) suppression of entrepreneurs (i.e. disabling the formation of the ‘bottom up’ 
market economy (whereby basic prerequisites for taking people out of poverty, 
inactivity and unemployment were not achieved)), (iv) very-open economy (ex-
posing weak local producers to strong external shocks), (v) not introducing fi-
nancial institutions and instruments coupled with non-adequate regulation and 
surveillance of financial markets, (vi) no renewal, or support for development 
of the research and development (R&D) sector (e.g. BiH is the lowest ranked 
country in Europe regarding per capita investment basis for research and devel-
opment); (vii) utilizing an orthodox currency board, (viii) by keeping an educa-
tional system of closed ethno-national societies instead of developing an edu-
cational system which would meet regional and global needs, BiH is ranked as 
the last country in Europe, according to DHL index of global connection, (ix) 
a lack of support for knowledge-based reindustrialisation of the economy, (x) 
total domination of non-productive (social and administrative) over productive 
public expenditures (research and development and physical infrastructure, pri-
marily the information and communication infrastructure), and (xi) a lack of 
support for development of value chains and production clusters (e.g. through 
public procurement, support packages for companies, etc.), (xii) failure to imple-
ment adequate pricing policy, especially the stabilization through stockpiles, etc. 
BiH will not be able to achieve high rates of economic growth and employ-
ment until it has clear vision, strategy and development policy. The vision can 
only be becoming a high-income country. Other goals, such as becoming a mem-
ber of the EU can only be an operational aim, but not a strategic goal of BiH 
policy. On its way of development BiH does not need to become a member of 
the EU but it has to become a high-income country. Therefore, it is important 
to make a radical turn in development policies. The focus must be shifted from 
the last development wagon’s support (by applying subsidies, tax expenditures, 
credits of development banks, etc.) to unrestrained locomotive of the economic 
development. 
The basic problem of BiH economy is that its main economic engine is ex-
emplified in the public sector while the private and civil sectors are secondary. 
The inefficient public sector surpasses the weak private sector, as the main and 
the most prestigious employer in BiH economy. It is followed by the informal 
agriculture as the second largest employer. The Government takes a half of the 
country’s GDP and spends it primarily on socio-administrative expenses and 
providing service. 
The development must be based on foreign direct investment (FDI) as much 
as possible. Generally, this cannot be a plentiful source of investment financing. 
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However, a small country can hardly achieve strong development if it does not 
ensure technology transfer that is best encouraged by FDI inflow.
Because of the long term improvement of competitiveness of BiH economy it 
is necessary to conduct its second reindustrialization. 
Industrialization of BiH economy was conducted by the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. The first reindustrialization was conducted by the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the current BiH government should conduct 
the second reindustrialization of BiH economy (i.e. digitalization of its economy). 
BiH has a low share of value added from manufacturing in its GDP. It needs 
to double the share to reach the most appropriate economic comparators (e.g. 
Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia and Slovakia). BiH is encountering the transition 
of the existing low-technology exports to knowledge intensive export. 
I. Defective BiH policies
I.1 Deep internal and external disequilibria 
The introduction of the currency board in 1849, in the island of Mauritius, Af-
rica, and furthermore in Southern Asia and Caribbean was to ensure that British 
colonies have stable currency supported by monetary reserves in British pounds. 
There was neither need nor space for monetary policy in the colonies - money 
supply was gathered or shrunk according to pound reserves. The colonial gov-
ernments agreed on that because they maintained interests in monetary reserves 
abroad. After the WWII most independent colonies established their central 
banks and abandoned the currency board. The currency boards appeared at the 
beginning of 1990s after the fall of communism and/or the appearance of hyper-
inflation. Here we are interested in how this youngest, the most orthodox from of 
all regimes of currency board(s) functions in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Great and unused advantage of the currency board is a mechanism of ad-
justing current account of balance of payment, as the one which existed in the 
conditions of the gold standard (described in 1752 by David Hume, the father of 
economic science), and which the currency board is the most similar to. 
If the country has a trade deficit the money supply shrinks causing interest 
rates growth and the withdrawal of foreign capital. High interest rates translate 
into deflationary pressure which leads to reduced imports, enlarged exports and 
improvement of foreign trade balance. This in turn leads to reduction in prices (if 
they are flexible) and makes exports more attractive. This causes the production to 
grow to its full employment level, export to increase and the elimination of current 
account deficits, which makes economy balanced internally and externally. 
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This mechanism does not function in BiH, as shown by the long term internal 
and external disequilibria. There is a high unemployment rate, low rate of eco-
nomic growth and a high current account deficit, etc. The only positive result of 
the existing currency board is that there is no inflation.
According to views of those who advocate the currency board, the foreign 
exchange reserve should grow in parallel with external surpluses (i.e. recede with 
deficits causing changes in prices and interest rates). However, BiH is experienc-
ing something quite different: there are current account deficits and the growth 
of foreign exchange reserves (and money supply at the same time). The Central 
Bank of BiH celebrates (just as the Indirect Taxation Authority which is proud of 
increased collections) without wondering who pays the ultimate price for it.
Since there are no policies to correct the external disequilibria that have 
marked the entire post-war period, net international investment position of the 
country (of what BiH invests abroad minus what foreigners invest in BIH) is 
-53 percent of GDP, hence, lower than the acceptable -35%. Fortunately for BiH, 
this disequilibrium is not financed only with credits, but also with non-credit 
resources, such as foreign exchanges from the non-observed economy’s export, 
pensions, remittances to relatives in BiH, diaspora’s investments in BiH, FDI and 
portfolio investments in BiH economy. 
Table 1:
Importance of personal remittances; BiH, 2009-2015 (in billions of BAM)
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Nominal GDP 24,78 25,35 26,21 26,19 26,74 27,30 28,21
Final consumption expenditure 25,87 26,79 27,64 27,46 27,48 28,56
Gross domestic savings -1,09 -1,44 -1,43 -1,27 -0,74 -1,26
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) -4,39 -5,68 -5,44 -4,84 -2,77 -4,61
GNI 25,74 25,76 26,42 26,40 27,08 27,49 28,48
Final consumption expenditure 25,87 26,79 27,64 27,46 27,48 28,56
Net current transfers from abroad 3,34 3,53 3,54 3,68 3,69 3,97 3,56
Gross savings 3,22 2,50 2,33 2,61 3,30 2,89
Gross savings (% of GDP) 12,98 9,87 8,88 9,98 12,33 10,57
Personal transfers (Current 
transfers between resident and 
non-resident households) - credit
2,01 2,01 2,09 2,17 2,31 2,38
Source: authors’ calculations based on the World Bank, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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The main sources of personal remittances are (i) relatives’ remittances and 
(ii) remittances with sources in the non-observed economy (the Central Bank 
treats them as typical remittances but they are de facto primary income that stays 
non-observed for the Central Bank, and statistic agencies in BiH that have a gap 
between the size of income by expenditure approach5 and production/income 
expenditure).6 Thanks to diaspora remittances and foreign exchanges of inter-
national financial institutions (e.g. MMF, the World Bank, and EBRD), that are 
given as a credit or a grant, BiH manages to survive. 
In 2014 BiH7 had a GDP of 28.2 billion BAM. That GDP contained personal 
consumption (23.38 billion BAM), government final consumption (6.08 billion 
BAM), investment (5.02 billion BAM), and net export (-6.28 billion BAM) ex-
port (9.26 billion BAM) and import (15.54 billion BAM). Therefore, it is vis-
ible that domestic savings are negative. If we deduct consumption (private sector 
consumption of 23.38 billion BAM and government final consumption of 6.08 
billion BAM) from the income of 28.2 billion BAM we have negative domestic 
savings of 1.26 billion BAM or -4.5% GDP.
Today, we can raise the question “who is being spread too thin”. The answer is 
the government since it constantly runs budget deficits. In 2014, the government 
had a budget deficit of 0.61 billion BAM, which means it spent more than 610 
million BAM than it collected in revenues. The private sector (e.g. households, 
non-profit organizations and companies) spent 650 million BAM more than it 
had in income. Thus, total domestic savings was minus 1.26 billion BAM (see 
Table 2).
It is necessary to differentiate between national (total) savings and domes-
tic savings to understand how BiH managed to finance the aforementioned five 
billion BAM of investment. When domestic savings increase by the size of net 
personal transfers this provides us with the total size of national savings. The BiH 
national savings rate is 10.5% of GDP. Net transfers from abroad are taking BiH 
out of negative zone of -4.6% of GDP into the positive zone of 10.5% of GDP. As 
for other countries from the zone of negative values, Kosovo and Moldova are 
5 What is recorded as a transfer in the balance of payments of the Central Bank represents the of-
ficial remittances that are 40% less than actual remittances. Around 80% of remittances (formal and 
non-observed) are put into official channels through consumption, causing gaps in national system 
accounts.
6 There is a large gap between the data on remittances flows provided by the Central bank of BiH 
and much lower amount reported by households in household budget surveys (Oruč, 2011). We 
estimate that a half of these personal remittances have the origin in the non-observed economy. It 
should also be noted that 47.7% of the BiH diaspora live in Croatia and Serbia. This requires detail 
account on who, how much, where from and what remittances are sent to BiH. There is a large gap 
between the data on remittances flows.
7 Still, there is no detailed data for 2015, so illustration is based on 2014 data. There are no signifi-
cant differences between these two years.
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saved by remittances to an even larger extent reaching +17.7 and +17.0% of GDP 
respectively. In short, their diaspora sends more than BiH diaspora. The personal 
foreign remittances of BiH are around 2 billion BAM, and in 2014 they were 2.3 
billion BAM (World Bank, 2016). 
Table 2:
Savings, investment; 2014
Income Domestic savings National savings
• Y=28.20
• C=23.38
• G=6.08
• I=5.02
• E=9.26
• Im=15.54
• Y=C+G+I +(E-I)
• 28.20=23.38+6.08+5.02+(9.26-15.54)
• S=Y-C-G
• S=28.20 -23.38 -6.08 
• S= -1.26
• S= - 4.5%
 
• S=I+CA
• -1.26=5.02+(9.26-15.54)
• -1.26=5.02-6.28
• S-CA=I
• -1.26 - (9.26-15.54)=5.02
• -1.26+6.28=5.02
Government savings Private savings
• Sg=T-G
• -0.61 (=2.2% Y)
• -0.61=T-6.08
• -0.61+6.08=T
• 5.47=T
• S=Sg + Sp 
• -1.26=-0.61 + Sp 
• -1.26+0.61=Sp 
• -0.65=Sp 
• Sp=Y-T-C
• Sp=28.2-5.47- 23.38
• Sp=-0.65 
• S=Sp + Sg 
• -1.26= -0.65 -0.61 
• -1.26=-1.26
Source: authors’ calculations based on the World Bank, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
When inflows of foreign exchanges weaken (or they are stopped by putting 
BiH on the black list), BiH economy is threatened by chaos or collapse. One 
source of those inflows, mother-bank loans to daughter-bank loans, dried out. 
Before the global crisis of 2008, it was a plentiful source of foreign exchange and 
financial sources of credit and in turn it had strong aggregate demand increase 
and economic growth of almost 7 % of GDP. With global crisis the economic 
growth of BiH virtually collapsed and since then it has had a growth rate of 1-2% 
per year.
If one or two larger banks were to withdraw from BiH it would cause a strong 
contraction of the money supply for which BiH has no antidote. Actual behav-
iour of foreign banks that are strengthening more non-interest income than in-
terest bearing ones, acts as a brake on the economy. 
BiH has effectively lost control over its monetary and financial system. When 
pounds from Mauritius are relocated to London, the foreign exchange reserves 
of 10 billion BAM are outside BiH (and serve only to discipline the local politi-
cians). In addition, the banks are not under the (efficient) supervision of the BiH 
government. They are controlled by two banking agencies that have become mere 
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instruments of banks, just one step lower than their Bank Association, a pure 
lobbying organization. When banks whose deposits originate to a large extent 
from the public company’s deposits decide to buy treasury bills they engage in 
that activity (or decide not to buy in order to corner the government, as it was 
the case recently).
I.2. Middle-income trap
Many countries have developed rapidly after the WWII and have become mid-
dle income countries. Few of them continued to develop and became high in-
come countries.8 According to the World Bank, certain countries are stuck in “the 
middle-income trap”.9 Resources that enable high growth of countries with low 
income (e.g. natural resources, cheap labour force and easily absorbed technol-
ogy) do not enable growth of countries with high income. 
A journey from a middle income country to a high income country requires 
the direction of resources into highly-productive, skilled and knowledge inten-
sive activities. The production of higher value-added goods seeks qualified work-
ers who need to have higher wages. Due to the increase in wages the manufactur-
ing companies in upper middle income countries often deal with the situation 
of not being competitive in the export markets where more efficient producers 
operate. 
Journey from a middle income country to a high income country is based 
upon export-led development (i.e. the exploitation of global demand at deep 
elastic markets for their products). In this way four “small tigers” (i.e. Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) increased export of industrial prod-
ucts from 4.6 billion in 1962 to 715 billion US dollars in 2004 (US$ in 2000). In 42 
years they increased their exports by 155 times. Domestic markets could not se-
cure that. When in 1950 South Korea followed the strategy of substitution import 
(“buy domestic”), it had the economic growth rate of 2-3% per year. Since the use 
of “export domestic” strategy in 1960s, the growth rate has jumped to over 7% 
per year or more in 41 years and the country has become an economic miracle 
(Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). 
The ratio of exports to BiH’s GDP is one third of GDP, while the ratio of 
imports is almost 60% of GDP. BiH export is twice lower than simple average of 
8 After the WWII only 30 countries managed to pass the way from a middle income to a high in-
come country. Five of them succeeded by 1950 and 25 after 1950 (Felipe, Kumar and Galope, 2014). 
In 1961 there were 101 countries with middle income, and by 2008 only 13 became countries of 
high income (Larson, Loayza and Woolcock, 2016).
9 This term was first introduced by Gill and Kharas 2007 in a study “An East Asian Renaissance: 
Ideas for Economic Growth.” Since then, there has been a debate about the concept which here in 
the case of BiH is used for diagnostic purposes while the therapy is based upon viewpoints of Com-
mission on Growth and Development (2008) – discussed in detail in the third part of this work.
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the small European transition countries. BiH export per capita is ten times lower 
than the export of Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The simple averag-
es for European transition countries are 54% for exports and 57% for imports. It 
is a common sense that values of imports and export should be equal in the long 
run, but it is not normal and it is unsustainable to have imports double the size 
of exports which is the case of BiH (the World Bank, 2016). BiH has low exports 
due to a lack of tradable goods. Globally looking, modern economies are service-
based with the aggregate production dominated by the production of services, 
but the international economy is based on goods trading - the total export of 
goods and services consists of four-fifths in goods, and the remaining quarter in 
services export. Those who do not have tradable goods drop out of international 
trade and the international capital market.
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Figure 1: Export and import; BiH and comparators, 2015.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on the World Bank (2017)
“The middle-income trap” country is the one that stays in that state for more 
than the average time of retention. In the school terminology, a student who stays 
longer than one year in a class is a bad student, and needs to repeat the class. Ar-
gentina and Greece are the most famous repeaters in the class of higher middle 
income. It took Argentina 40 years (1970-2010), and Greece 28 years (1972-2000) 
to become high income countries. According to the World Bank, the transition 
from an upper middle income to a high income country lasted on average 14 
years and in the case of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong it lasted seven years. 
For 18 years BiH has been a middle income country. After two post-war recon-
struction years, for 18 years now, BiH has been an upper middle income country. 
Undoubtedly, BiH is not going to be a good student but it is still far from being 
the worst one (i.e. to have Argentina and Greece syndrome).
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II. How to reach effective BiH policies
Five main ingredients of high and stable development, based on the experience 
of countries that have become economic miracles, are: (Commission on Growth 
and Development 2008; Jones and Romer, 2009; Stiglitz, 2012; Lin, 2012): 
1. Involvement in international economy (openness)
2. Macroeconomic stability
3. High rates of savings and investment
4. Market allocation of resources, and
5. Small, determined and capable government.
In addition, during the last three decades the prevailing view has been that 
the best strategies of development for small middle income countries, such as 
BiH, are export-led development strategies. Their main characteristics are: high 
investment and savings, high foreign investment, and high export of industrial 
products. Specifically, what high-growth Asian small tigers, which have also be-
come economic miracles, have in common is: high saving and investment rates, 
rapidly improving education level, relatively moderate inflation rates and if not 
free trade, then at least a high degree of openness and integration with the world 
markets (Krugman, Obsfteld and Melitz, 2015).
Therefore, it is necessary to bring export-led strategies to all levels of BiH 
government. Their existence is like a light bulb in a dark room. The room can 
be crossed without the light but it will take time and bring along some painful 
bruises. Foreign trade policy of BiH must facilitate foreign trade transaction of 
companies and be connected with the biggest socio-economic questions of the 
country (i.e. unemployment, rural development, inactivity, poverty and inequal-
ity) in order to secure jobs. 
Incentives for export rather than for exporters, have to be short-term (what is 
the purpose of a country’s comparative advantage if it should be supported limit-
lessly!) and agnostic (country must support export without specific benefits for 
some companies).
In 1955 a development economist Arthur Lewis said that “governments are 
failing because they are doing too little or too much”. During the promotion of 
sustainable economic development the government must focus on creating the 
environment for economic activity which will easily introduce new undertakings.
In the most adequate way the government will adhere to market function-
ing and create conditions to introduce new economic activities if its intervention 
is adjusted to the country’s comparative advantages, defined by the structure of 
available production factors in the current period, among which knowledge and 
entrepreneurship are (Lin, 2012, Stiglitz, 2012). 
BiH policy makers do not support the development of competitive market. 
They strongly support the existence of moral hazard because it helps non-effi-
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cient public companies to stay in the market10 even when they are making a loss. 
Some public companies are in privileged position and extract rents. For example 
the prices (and profits based on them) of telecom operators are high which pre-
vents development of entrepreneurship through unaffordable production inputs 
and distancing telecoms from the global production frontier and it damages their 
legal privatization.11
Policy makers should resist demands to protect activities, companies or jobs. 
Instead, they should protect people. The best protection that a government can 
offer is education and training (acquiring skills that enable people to become em-
ployed) and creating the environment which secures jobs and helps people find 
jobs. By respecting the solidarity principle people need to be supported when 
they are between two jobs by the social security. That is why the unemployment 
benefit exists. 
In BiH the economic growth rates of less than 7% per year are not acceptable. 
It is necessary to increase production to improve competitiveness by 3% per year 
(in order to achieve Copenhagen’s criteria to enter the EU) and to increase em-
ployment by 4% per year (in order to reduce mass inactivity and unemployment 
to prevent the collapse of health and retirement funds). Over the last 21 years no 
significant level of government of BiH has made clear strategies and productivity 
policies. Some levels of government had an employment strategy but today there 
is none. 
BiH was on the threshold of those high growth rates in 2007 with the growth 
rate of 6% and in 2008 it was 6, 8%. In those successive years BiH was even close 
to 7%. With 7% growth rate it could reach income of 9.400 US$ in 10 years. This 
would overpass today’s global average, with income larger than Romania’s. By 
increasing the growth rate to 10,5-11,0% in ten years BiH would ensure income 
per citizen of 12.196 US$ (entering the group of countries with high income) 
(Domljan, 2014).
10 There is no study on tax expenditures in BiH (what the country will lose due to tax exemptions, 
exceptions, etc., because of supporting certain sectors, regions or social groups and what it will get 
with it), nor a consolidated balance sheet of the public sector to see when and how many losses it 
creates and to whose account.
11 Economic privatization was carried out when the public companies became political party hold-
ings. The profits of these “public companies” are stripped by managers and employees through pay-
roll and uncontrolled employment, through public procurement and by the government through 
taxes. Citizens do not participate in business results through lower prices and better quality ser-
vices. Thus, the economic situation is the same as it was in communism: working class and people 
do not get anything - a piece of fruit is taken by the privileged social groups. Only the terminology 
has changed: the company is not a “social” but “public” property.
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II.1 Cities-regions and value chains, engines of economic development
BiH needs to focus on supply-side economics12 and find engines for export and 
development. These could be cities-region and value chains (VCs), or even better 
value chains of cities-regions. Policy makers need to analyse global niches and 
decide where it is easiest to become technological leader and achieve economies 
of scale.
Cities-regions are current pockets of excellence from which excellence needs 
to be spread to country-wide and support BiH’s fitting into the space of South-
Eastern Europe and Mediterranean and gradually to the EU space. In cities-re-
gions (Banja Luka, Bihać, Bijeljina, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica) it is necessary 
to support VCs where BiH has traditional comparative advantage, and where it 
needs to acquire that advantage, primarily in the areas of software production 
and creative goods. 
Even though the total share of BiH economy in global export is 0.028 %, the 
country is struggling for global niches where the share of its leading companies 
is 0.10-0.70%. It takes the 20th-30th place among 100-130 countries exporters of 
certain products. BiH has a chance to become a leader of certain global niches. 
This can be achieved with development of VCs based on large-scale compa-
nies as leaders of VCs and inclusion of large number of micro, small and me-
dium enterprises (MSMEs) where some of them function as locomotives and 
others as wagons. At the same time government’s support policies can grow out 
of policies of VCs into cluster policies. Based on the EU countries’ experience the 
cluster policy is conducted at the regional level, even in constitutionally unitary 
countries (Italy), and especially in federal countries (Switzerland, Belgium). The 
cluster policy is conducted in BiH at the regional level. 
BiH’s cities-regions have rich cultural diversity which is an excellent basis for 
development of creative economy. Multiculturalism encourages creativity. In BiH 
creative economy’s production and export have minor significance causing for-
eign trade deficit even in this field. Creative economy is an important part of 
knowledge economy. It has strong economic growth and employment growth in 
comparison to the total economy, and it is an important component of cultural 
identity and development of cultural diversity as a basis for modern development. 
Primarily based on ideas, not on capital, the creative economy leans on unlimited 
resources, not on optimization of limited resources such as manufacturing.
12 It is very difficult to conduct demand side economic policy in BiH under the currency board 
(renunciation of monetary policy and exchange rate policy) and with a lack of institutions and in-
struments, and above all political interests of policy-making at the country level. Only indirect tax 
policy could be conducted at the macro level - direct tax policy is led at the lower (mezzo) levels.
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Therefore, BiH, which neglects the export of intangible goods, needs to focus 
on export of creative services, business services and financial service and above 
all export of software and software services.
II.2 Aggressive knowledge production 
Observed from contemporary industrial society’s viewpoint let alone from 
knowledge based society and digital economy’s viewpoint, BiH has an insuffi-
ciently skilful work force. Only 5.7% of citizens older than 25 have a university 
degree (150.000). All regional and economic comparators have relatively more 
educated citizens with tertiary education (both high and higher). Without the 
acquisition of knowledge there is no removal of the technology gap in BiH in 
comparison with high income countries. Insufficient number of students in BiH, 
especially at the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics and the Faculty of 
Technology, makes a fragile basis for recruitment of research-development per-
sonnel. Research-development centres are scarce in the companies (in the EU 
countries 60% of total number of researchers are employed at the centres of this 
type), so there are no preconditions for companies to be successful in product 
development. Globally observed BiH is among countries with the lowest innova-
tion capacity (Nair, 2008). Due to small investments into R&D, the production 
and dissemination of knowledge are low (see Figure 2). Out of all comparators 
only Albania has the lowest knowledge production. 
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NB: a bubble marks the county’s total patent activity 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Dutta and Lanvin (2013)
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The number of patent resident applications reported to the BiH patent author-
ities is lower than any economic or regional comparators and the simple average 
for all forms of country income groups except for low-income countries. Glo-
balisation in BiH is lagging behind because of poor physical infrastructure (and 
promotion of closed society). As for the physical infrastructure, primarily it is be-
hind comparator countries on ICT infrastructure (Domljan and Domljan, 2014). 
The world is becoming physically and economically more remote for citizens and 
companies from BiH, as it is more difficult, more expensive and more distant to 
travel. As the time and economic distance in Europe are decreasing, for example, 
in an hour or two you can get to the end of Europe. In BiH you can hardly arrive 
to Mostar from Sarajevo by road – but not by rail or plane. 
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Figure 3: Export and import of ICT goods; World, 2014 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the WB (2017) 
Today there are over 400 science parks in the world, which are already passing 
the third generation of development. Of course, most of them are in the United 
States (150), Japan (111) and China (100), which began to develop in the mid-
1980s, and there are dozens in Africa. Thus, according to the International Trade 
Centre (ITC), e-commerce in Africa amounted to 8 billion US $ in 2013, and it 
will amount to 50 billion US $ in 2018.
The question is no longer how to ensure internationalization of SMEs, be-
cause micro-enterprises are born as global firms from the start. They use “plug 
and play” Internet infrastructure platform, so they can reach a global customer 
base and become exporters without any problems. According to the World Bank 
(2010), there are 125 million MSMEs, while Facebook (2016) estimates 50 mil-
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lion MSMEs which use this platform, out of which 30% are foreign MSMEs. BiH 
must work, as quickly as possible, on the establishment of digital platforms for 
many reasons, and one is overreaching, namely, a very small BiH market. 
II.3 Increasing savings and investment
One of the lessons from the experiences of countries that have strongly de-
veloped and become world miracles, is that there was no high economic growth 
without high rates of savings and investment. For example, China saved each year 
more than a third of income for more than a quarter of the century, but in recent 
years it has saved about a half of gross domestic product.
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BiH has a negative rate of domestic savings, spanning from -3 to -6 percent 
of GDP and the low rate of overall national savings, which is about 9-13% of 
GDP. Global average of domestic savings is about two tenths of GDP, while BiH 
is among ten countries on the globe that save least. Only two European coun-
tries (Kosovo and Moldova) save less than BiH. On the other hand, BiH invested 
around 15 percent of GDP in the period after the outbreak of the global recession, 
which was significantly below the global average of nearly a quarter of GDP.
BiH has a higher rate of investment than the savings rate, which means that it 
is ‘importing’ foreign savings and the inflow of foreign capital in the size of these 
differences. As long as import is higher than export of goods and services, invest-
ments are financed with ‘imported’ savings. 
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II.3.1 Introduction of non-bank depository institutions
The main reason for the low savings rate and consequently the rate of investment 
and growth rate of GDP is the underdevelopment of the financial system of the 
country. There is no variety of financial institutions and financial instruments 
capable of mobilising resources ranging from a few BAM (micro institutions that 
accept deposits - in BiH it is prohibited by law) to several billion BAM (through 
infrastructure bonds issuances). There is no law in BiH on mutual guarantee 
funds, savings banks, savings and loan associations (there is a law in the Republic 
of Srpska), financial holding companies and credit guarantee funds for over two 
decades.
The World Bank research shows that reform of the financial markets provides 
GDP growth of two percentage points. Simply put, only a reform of the financial 
system and attracting diaspora funds (which, to a large extent, can mean one 
stone hits two birds, but in BiH it means one stone missing two birds) can beat 
glum rates of GDP growth of 1-2% per year (we do not know for sure what the 
growth rate was in 2015) to minimal 5%.
The creators of economic policy in BiH did not develop the financial system. 
They reduced it to five-six foreign commercial banks whose aim is (quite legiti-
mate, there is nothing to complain about) making profit and not funding the 
development of BiH.
About 90% of the financial system of BiH is controlled by commercial banks, 
the only existing banks, with the exception of development banks that are noth-
ing but a pocket bank of the ruling elite. Insurance companies control a half of the 
remaining 10% (due to mandatory car insurance), and the other half is controlled 
by the leasing companies and microcredit organizations.
There is a complete dominance of foreign commercial banks in the financial 
system of BiH. Worst of all - which did not exist even in the former communist 
countries of Eastern Europe, let alone in the communist BiH - is what exists in 
the capitalist BiH: The law on banks prohibits non-bank financial institutions, be-
cause no institution other than a bank can collect deposits and grant loans. There 
is no doubt that with the transfer of the EU legislation BiH and especially FBiH 
shall abolish this civilization’s shame on the soil of Europe. 
The Banking Act should regulate banks and abandon any mentioning of non-
bank depository institutions in the law (especially regulated by banking agen-
cies). Other deposit taking and credit approving institutions should be regulated 
by other, respective laws, in which, on the other hand, operation of banks should 
not be limited. It would be unreasonable, by using law on savings banks or sav-
ings-credit cooperatives, to limit the work of commercial, investment, develop-
ment and other types of banks.
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High real interest rate can be lowered only by creating competition in the 
financial market and inflows of funds from abroad. Extremely difficult task is to 
lower the interest rate, one of the most difficult in economic policy. Since 1995, 
in the capitalist BiH we have not seen any measure of economic policy makers 
aimed at lowering interest rates. What should the government do in this regard? 
The correct way of pushing banks towards reducing interest rates is to reduce sys-
temic risk and increase competition in the financial market.
In developed economies the financial system relies on two legs - mobilizing 
capital by taking deposits (commercial banks, savings banks, etc.), and mobiliz-
ing capital through the capital market (investment banks, development banks, 
mutual funds, etc.). In BiH, the book is reduced to an institutional letter, i.e. the 
commercial banks. No savings, no development banks (in BiH called the Entity 
Development Bank) have ever been engaged in mobilizing resources before wait-
ing for the funds to be allocated to them in a way funds and agencies function. 
Therefore, these so-called development banks cannot be called development 
banks because they are not bank institution at all, neither collect nor place funds 
through market mechanisms and instruments, etc. How is it possible to have high 
saving rates in BiH? 
The banking mediation in BiH was effective (and banks considered it ‘the best 
part of BiH economy’, which is quite wrong, as the situation with the banking sys-
tem in the Republic of Srpska clearly shows) when the mother-bank sent money 
to subsidiary banks, and they traded with it. In the era of Great Recession mother 
banks do not send money (they are committed to the Vienna Initiative that asks 
them not to withdraw) - which is not the worst part. The problem is that these 
subsidiary banks have almost no one to credit and they are swimming in liquidity 
(with a share of risky loans due to asymmetric information, an increasing num-
ber of good companies are “engaged with the enemy” while bad companies do 
not have the similar problem), and business sectors in insolvency.
The unfavourable general and business environment, particularly high fiscal 
and parafiscal burdens, are forcing the private sector to emigrate (underground 
or abroad) or (hopefully temporarily) to close the firm. ‘Corporate-cows’, organi-
cally grown and with no support, are long lasting and poorly developed while 
the citizens-clients can still be found in some public monopoly enterprises. But 
there the situation is more difficult, because the authorities succeed in putting 
these monopolies into losses (as Elektroprivreda and Telecom companies clearly 
show). Such companies, whose profits are the spring of economic life of economy, 
precisely of savings and investment, are decreasingly generated.
Competition in the banking market must be sharpened with the introduc-
tion of non-bank deposit taking financial institutions, such as savings banks. The 
threshold for the establishment of commercial bank should be increased to 20 
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million BAM, while the savings banks could be established with 10 million BAM. 
This would help in the further consolidation of the banking system, while the 
remaining banks could be transformed into savings banks.13 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, savings banks could be established in cities-re-
gions, which would serve the needs of citizens and MSMEs. They could acquire 
20-30% of the credit market, as in the case of the economic comparators, that is 
to say at least five billion BAM, thereby employing about 5,000 workers.14 
According to available statistical data, today it is possible to have the savings 
and credit unions in 109 countries on six continents. 15 Movement of credit coop-
eratives began with a simple idea: individuals can improve their own and other 
people’s standard of living by putting their savings in the common pile and lend-
ing it to neighbours and colleagues.
This year, on the World Day of the credit, the first credit union in (F)BiH, 
Spark 1 was formed. It is called Spark 1 because it is expected that the Spark 1 
will be joined by Spark 2, 3, and it will be possible to form a league of credit co-
operatives, like the one developed by Desjardins in Canada. We should recall that 
credit unions in the country were developed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 
the early 20th century, when they had strong growth, which weakened in the era 
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Yugoslavia, while in the capitalist 
BiH they were not only extinguished but also forbidden by law. 
II.3.2 Development of government bonds market
No matter how good they are, foreign banks are not able to mobilize large amounts 
of capital, while BiH development banks are not interested in dealing with it. The 
securities market is not developed. The number of potential issuers of attractive 
13 Savings Bank, a financial institution over 300 years old, is strongly developed in Europe, but not 
in BiH. Modern societies adorn regional and responsible 3R retail. They are involved in retail bank-
ing (payments, savings products and loans and insurance for citizens and SMEs), since commercial 
banks are distinguished by the fact that they focus on the local and regional markets.
14 According to the World Institute of Savings (World Savings Banks Institute, WSBI, operating 
since 1924), with its members from 92 countries it shows countries where there are savings from 
those with low income (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Uganda, Togo), the com-
munist countries (Cuba, China), transition countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, etc.), and those ‘rich countries’ (Austria , France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, UK, USA, etc.).
15 It began in 1844 in Rochdale, England, and in 1849 in Germany. Today it is possible to see them 
in 25 African countries, 21 Asian countries, 19 Caribbean countries, 14 European countries, 15 
Latin American countries, 2 North American countries and 14 countries in Oceania. They can be 
seen from Burkina Faso and Uganda, through Myanmar, Albania and the Netherlands to Canada 
and the United States. There are a total of 60,500 credit cooperatives, with assets of 1.8 trillion US 
$, serving 223 million people.
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securities (shares, bonds, etc.) is small. None of the other domestic players has an 
interest in the pump priming finance and the government remains as the solution.
Firstly, infrastructure bonds with maturities of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years could be 
purchased by BiH citizens. Citizens now have nearly five billion BAM of savings 
in BiH banks. There are no other possibilities, except to keep the money under 
‘the mattresses’ as a dead capital or abroad as a placement (or, at least some of 
them become business angels or loan sharks). The yield on government bonds 
would be safer and more profitable (higher yield of bonds than from interests on 
bank savings). And it would be very liquid, because it could be traded in the bond 
market. Objectively, calculations could be intertwined by inflation, but it is no-
where in sight, nor will it be as long as the currency board functions as orthodox.
For instance it is clear that public pension funds in BiH could face a collapse 
unless deep structural reforms are undertaken, since citizens need security in 
their old age. By purchasing bonds a person can do more for his/her (healthy) 
child than to provide a good education, through the purchase of bonds. And as 
the child gets to the college and receives education, bonds will come for collec-
tion.
Investing in bonds is not only a good and safe investment for citizens, both at 
home and abroad, but also a good opportunity for domestic financial institutions 
(savings banks, which make long-term placed assets in these bonds, insurance 
companies, public companies, private companies and banks, etc.), which would 
address issues of over/under current assets by selling and buying bonds. 
The infrastructure bonds would be bought, for example, in the part of the 
20% of issuance, by banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds 
and citizens. Banks would hold the respective bonds as a first-class, 100% secure 
placement, hence the provision of them would be 0%. Also, a regulation could be 
adopted according to which a part of the foreign reserves at the Central Bank in 
excess of the coverage of 110% could be held in these bonds. In this way second-
ary bond market could be developed. Banks and other institutions could release 
excess liquidity with profitable, secure and liquid placement. This would contrib-
ute to the strengthening of the credit system because the banks, savings banks 
and credit unions could accept these bonds as security for loans.
II.3.3. Powerful mobilization of diaspora funds 
With the appropriate policies, BiH can make significant use of its diaspora com-
munity which includes emigrants and their descendants - to support the econo-
my. Mitra et al (2016b) found that diaspora can help raise long-term economic 
growth, on average, by 0.6 percent of GDP in emerging and developing home 
countries (Mitra, 2016a), while in emerging Europe diaspora can contribute with 
1.4 percent of GDP (Mitra et al, 2016a). In the post-global crisis BiH has had 
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GDP growth rate oscillating around 1-2 %. Accordingly, tapping into diaspora’s 
resources could double the GDP growth rate, which BiH desperately needs.
Table 3:
GDP; BiH, 2014-2021 constant prices (in %)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
GDP growth rate 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.2
Diaspora's potential contribution 
to GDP growth rate
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Source: Mitra (2016) and authors’ calculations
IMF research shows that central and eastern European countries can increase 
GDP growth by 1.4% percent if they manage to attract diaspora funds. BiH could 
provide a higher GDP growth rate than the average for central and eastern Eu-
ropean countries due to the abundance of its diaspora and the size of sent remit-
tance.
II.4 Cutting public expenditure by one third
BiH must implement fiscal consolidation, i.e. remove the fiscal disorder, fiscal 
deficits and reduce public debt. Also, it must reduce all types of public expendi-
tures and introduce R&D expenditure, increase them (at once 1%, over the next 
two years 2% and over another two years 3%) and strive to maintain this rate.
In particular it is necessary to review public expenditure on social programs. A 
set of measures is needed to support, starting from the introduction of ID cards 
(to determine who, how, how much and from whom it is received, both from BiH 
and outside, and to put the whole social security system under control), to politi-
cal and legal review of the basis for granting aid.
It is necessary to act on public revenues (diverting taxation and contributions 
from labour and exports to consumption, property and imports, i.e. to imple-
ment fiscal devaluation), especially to expand fiscal space.
In the existing circumstances it should be necessary to pass a law that would 
ban state borrowing for current consumption. If despite everything loans are taken, 
this should at least prevent money from going into non-productive expenditures. 
Thus, the debt offspring will have infrastructure and skills. 
Measurement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector (of public 
expenditure and public companies) is very limited in BiH. It is necessary to start 
benchmarking the activities of these institutions, i.e. to simulate operation of the 
market in non-market activities.
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II.5 Reduction of non-observed economy and tax evasion
Last year Association of Employers of FBiH published a Grey Book, which is 
based on primary research seeking to establish what drives the informal economy 
in the FBiH. According to employers, the main driver is fiscal burden. It compris-
es of 26.8% of the informal economy, followed by tax morale (23.2%), regulation 
(labour and other regulations) (16.5%), the quality of state institutions (14.2%), 
social support (6.1%) and political protection (7.9%).
In other countries, the order of drivers is almost identical: fiscal burden (35-
38%), tax morale (23.2%), regulation (7-9%), the quality of state institutions (10-
12%), social support (5-7% ) and political protection (0%, respectively in studies 
for other countries this driver is not recognized as valid, while in FBiH it has 
some significance).
When it comes to taxes, it should be noted that in the case of FBiH the prob-
lem is the size of social contributions and the procedures for paying taxes. A large 
number of procedures and the number of payments require immense time and 
administrative work.
The tax morale is the driver as it was recently included in the survey of the 
grey economy. People are aware that the market can produce private goods, but 
not the public whose production has to be funded by the country. 
The country must treat the taxpayer as a contracting party. Government is on 
one side and the taxpayer is on the other. If the government treats the taxpayer 
fairly, and if he/she sees that the government produces public goods efficiently 
and distributes them equitably, he/she will duly pay taxes. And it is tax morale 
that FBiH employers understand and appreciate as a driver of the grey economy. 
The calculations show that in some countries tax morale amounts to 30% of the 
grey economy. Reducing the tax by 1% increases the grey economy by 0.20%. 
Simply put, if the taxpayer does not respect the government, he/she will “man-
age” in a variety of ways to avoid paying taxes and at the same time will have no 
remorse, quite the contrary. 
If the grey economy accounts for a quarter of the income of the country and 
a quarter of the work force, as in (F)BiH, it is clear that it cannot be eradicated 
overnight. BiH would achieve a great result if it managed in the mid-term to 
reduce the grey economy by a fifth, i.e. force it from a quarter to a fifth of GDP. 
Sequence of moves must be clear, starting from the one which would cause 
the least social and political tensions. Firstly, it is necessary to reduce the grey 
payment, then to reduce the grey income and ultimately to reduce the grey em-
ployment. Few people understand that in BiH the government creates the grey 
economy. Everyone knows there are a number of public institutions and compa-
nies (mines, railways, hospitals, etc.) that do not pay contributions for workers. 
If taxes and contributions are not paid, the public entity and its workers are auto-
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matically considered grey employment, grey sector and the grey economy. Also, 
within a range of organizations, both public and private, the part of the salary is 
paid as a minimum wage, and it is a formal sector to that extent. Another part of 
the salary is paid in cash and to that extent it is a shadow economy.
Around 3.3 billion of cash is outside the Central Bank and banks. There is no 
doubt that at least in part, cash payments are used in the grey economy. These 
flows should be stopped. It is necessary to introduce electronic payment of social 
benefits, to determine the maximum amount that can be paid in cash (which 
already exists in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, etc.), 
to use POS terminals for certain types of sectors and types of companies (which 
exists in South Korea ), a lottery for those who picked up the bills for which VAT 
is paid, tax incentives for buyers and merchants who use electronic payment (e.g. 
the return of 0.02% VAT) which will probably be hard for the Indirect Taxation 
Authority, which alarmed the BiH VAT system and does not want to implement 
it (as seen in South Korea and Uruguay). According to EY if BiH started this way 
it could further increase tax revenues in the amount of 4.2 % of GDP. This is 1.2 
billion BAM, which is even more than the latest arrangement with the IMF. 
Note on the statistical basis for the design of policies
Superficial views of Figure 5 show that there is something wrong with BiH sta-
tistics (the strong money supply growth of 5-10% per year, accompanied by the 
price drop of about 1%). It would not be surprising if there were strong income 
growth, which is not the case: it grew at the rate of 1-3% per year.
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Figure 5: Real GDP, prices and money supply (in %); BiH, 2013-2015 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the CB BiH (2016)
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One thing is certain: the statistical agencies are doing their job poorly. To 
what extent, we can only assume. It is possible that this is a bad calculation of the 
growth rate (i.e. the actual growth rate is higher than statistically shown), a bad 
calculation of gross domestic product (there is a great non-observed economy) 
or a simultaneous bad calculation of price and income, which is likely the case. 
If we accepted that the statistical calculation of the price was correct, income 
growth would have to be far greater than statistically shown (there is a theoreti-
cal possibility of changing the speed of velocity of money, but the economic cir-
cumstances in the short period do not change, and it is difficult to work with the 
strong slowdown of the velocity of money).
It should also be noted that the growth in money supply results from an in-
crease in foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank, because it is a currency 
board arrangement. Purely theoretically observed, an increase in foreign ex-
change reserves may happen because the country has a surplus in its relations 
with foreign countries. However, since 1995 BiH has had a deficit in its relations 
with foreign countries.
Theoretically speaking, if the country has a trade deficit, the money supply 
of the country is shrinking (because the country needs to pay, and in the case of 
BiH the import is almost double the export of goods). This should lead to rising 
interest rates and attracting foreign capital (in BiH it happens that interest rates 
are high, and despite this there is no inflow of foreign capital, nor any action of 
this mechanism to establish equilibrium).
Furthermore, high interest rates should cause deflationary pressure which 
should lead to the decrease in imports and improve the balance of payments. 
Reduction of the pressure of buying funds to selling funds would lead to reduced 
prices and the depreciation of the real exchange rate, which would lead to the 
growth in exports and reduction in imports. All this should lead to an increase 
in production to the level of full employment and an increase in exports. Finally, 
the current account deficit should be eliminated and the economy achieves an 
internal and external equilibrium.
Only something of this happens in BiH in practice. Enormous unemployment 
and inactivity of the work force means that there is no establishment of internal 
equilibrium, economic growth rates are low and the current account deficits are 
high. No one knows how big the deficit of the public sector is since there is no 
consolidated balance sheet. There is no doubt that it is vast, because the moral 
hazard is equal to the communist times (as seen in the vast and uncovered losses 
of public companies). However, the price level is stable (at least there is no statis-
tically expressed rise in prices) and that is the result of the currency board in BiH. 
According to the currency board system, foreign exchange reserves need to 
grow with foreign trade surpluses and to fall with deficits, leading to price chang-
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es and interest rates changes. However, in BiH foreign exchange reserves grow 
along with the deficits in the current account. Now the question could be raised 
whether the balance of payment given by the Central Bank of BiH is correct. It 
is obvious that it is not, and the reason is simple: the official balance of payments 
greatly underestimates the foreign currency inflow. Primary and secondary in-
comes are much higher than it is officially stated. The export of goods and ser-
vices is higher than it is officially presented (the non-observed economy is high) 
and personal remittances are higher than officially reported.
It has already been shown that, due to personal remittances, the negative rate 
of domestic savings turns into the positive overall (national) savings rate. Now it 
can be said that these savings, both local and national, should be increased, es-
pecially when connected with the investment, which greatly exceeds the savings 
and there is no abundant inflow of funds from abroad.
In this work, we cannot go into the discussion on these issues, but we indicate 
them, because they are of a great importance for the evaluation and the design of 
economic policies.
Conclusion
To solve the problems BiH economy is facing, fundamental reforms which re-
quire wide participation of citizens are necessary. Reforms will have its losers 
(privatizers of social ownership, public sector employees, and recipients of public 
support) and winners (exporters, the unemployed, etc.).
The reforms are not implemented because political rulers do not change the 
existing institutional arrangements with a consensus (i.e. do not build unity with-
out imposing). Therefore they rely on ‘institutional doubt’, (i.e. the right of veto 
when they are a minority) and thus block the organized (institutional) induction 
of institutional arrangements. Ruling parties act in the interest of the parts of the 
ethnic groups, and not in the interests of the broader social classes. They deal 
with issues of distribution, not the production. The period from 1995 to 2017 has 
been the period of defective economic policies.
Effective policy, the one that is able to mobilize the factors of production, 
must be based on the creation of enterprises. Only that can save from the “curse 
of unemployment” (Keynes). Development is associated with high rates of ap-
pearance and disappearance of enterprises, (i.e. with high rates of turbulence and 
related reallocation of resources from unprofitable to profitable activities and 
companies).
The Dayton peace agreement does not inconvenience the regional authori-
ties to develop an entrepreneurial economy. For the development of tradition-
ally managed economy the key level of national economy and modern economic 
161
  
Vjekoslav Domljan et al. From Defective to Effective BiH Development Policy
management is crucial to regional development, especially in BiH where (volens-
nolens) central institutions and central instruments are non-existent or ineffec-
tive.
BiH will only be on its way of becoming a high income country if it activates 
the chain of knowledge production: the production of ideas - conducting research 
(testing ideas) - increase in knowledge stock - the commercialization of knowledge 
(i.e. innovation) - increase in productivity – increase in competitiveness – export 
increase in higher added value - increasing the standard of living.
BiH needs to radically cut parts of public expenditures rather than those in 
the R&D and productive physical infrastructure. It must introduce an aggressive 
innovation policy because it ensures the production of products with high tech-
nological content. Currently, their share in total exports of BiH industrial prod-
ucts is 2% or US $ 21 per capita. Among European and transition countries only 
Albania has worse result (though for 10 of them there is no indication).
References 
Centralna banka Bosne i Hercegovine (CB BiH), (2016). Godišnji izvještaj za 2015. 
Sarajevo: CB BiH.
Domljan I. and Domljan V. (2014). Opportunities for infrastructure projects in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In conference proceedings of People, Buildings and Environment 
2014, an international scientific conference, Kroměříž, Czech Republic, pp.135-143.
Domljan, V. (2014), Put u zaposlenost, Ekonomski institut, Sarajevo.
Dutta, S. and Lanvin, B. (eds), (2013), The Global Innovation Index 2012 - The Local 
Dynamics of Innovation, INSEAD, Fontainebleau.
Commission on Growth and Development, (2008), The Growth Report – Strategies for 
Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Enoch, C. and Gulde A-M, (1998). Are Currency Boards a Cure for All Monetary Prob-
lems? Finance and Development 35:4. December.
Felipe, J., Kumar, U. and Galope R., (2014). Middle-Income Transitions: Trap or Myth? 
ADB Economics Working Paper Series no. 421.
Gill, I. and Kharas, H., (2016), The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 7403.
Gill, I., Kharas, H. at al. (2007). An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth. 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund, (2017), WEO Database. Available at: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (Accessed January 10, 2017).
Jones, C.I. and Romer. P. M., (2009), The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Popula-
tion, and Human Capital. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15094.pdf?new_window=1 (Accessed 
27 November, 2012).
162
Acta Economica, Volume XV, No. 27 / December 2017 137 – 162
Krugman, P., Obstfeld M. And Melitz J. M. (2016). International Economics – Theory 
and Policy. Harlow: Pearson.
Larson, G., Loayza N. and Woolcock, M. (2016). The Middle-Income Trap: Myth or 
Reality? Research Policy Briefs from the World Bank Malaysia Hub No. 1.
Lin, J. Y., (2012). New Structural Economics - A Framework for Rethinking Development 
and Policy World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Mitra, P., (2016a). Addition by Subtraction: How Diasporas Can Boost Home-Coun-
try Growth.  iMFdirect – The IMF Blog, May 18.
Mitra P. et al, (2016b). Avoiding the New Mediocre Middle East and Central Asia De-
partment Raising Long-Term Growth in the Middle East and Central Asia: Wash-
ington, DC: IMF.
Nair, M., (2008). The ‘DNA’ of the New Economy, Economic Bulletin, 8: 27-59.
Lewis, A. (1955). The Theory of Economic Growth, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Il-
linois.
Oruc, N., (2011). Remittances and development: The case of Bosnia. Policy brief, Net-
work Migration in Europe.
Stiglitz, E. J., (2012). Comments on New Structural Economics: A Framework for Re-
thinking Development. In: J. Y. Lin. ed. 2012. New Structural Economics - A Frame-
work for Rethinking Development and Policy. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2017). World Development Indicators. Available at: http://data.world-
bank.org/topic (Accessed January 7, 2017).
